NATO Intervention in Kosovo in light of Security Council Actions and International Law by Salihu, MA. Arben
_____________________________ 
Iliria International Review – 2013/2 














The horrors of World War Two made it universally clear that 
the world cannot progress without general respect for human 
rights. Still, the need for humanitarian intervention arose several 
times before 1999, but international political and military 
organisations including the UN, were either late or hesitant to 
prevent genocides or other related human catastrophes 
worldwide. The NATO intervention in Kosovo, however, marked 
the beginning of the new era in international relations. The facet of 
this intervention in view of legality is the topic of this paper. The 
aim of this study, above all, is to analyze the Security Council 
actions, debates and resolutions concerning situation in Kosovo, 
and the level of impact that the military operation had in 
international law (in particular) and international relations (in 
general).  The study uses many authentic documents issued by the 
United Nations Security Council itself and other material related 
to the theme in order to develop an argument on the points raised. 
Throughout, this research paper has attempted to answer 
numerous issues related to the topic and offer a balanced view on 
the all the themes examined. Several but distinct points raised 
focus on relevant core subjects, discuss the challenges and 
opportunities of the humanitarian intervention and offer 
recommendations regarding the future of such operation for the 
well being of the humanity.   
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1. Introduction  
 
It is widely acknowledged that human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law are in every person’s and every state’s self interest and, in addition, are 
indispensable and fundamental pillars for building our common house and 
decent environment. The international community has, in fact, committed itself 
in the post-Holocaust world to a culture of human rights, which outlaws 
genocide, torture, and massive human rights abuses, but these principles that 
benefit humanitarianism tend to be incompatible with the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention.  
This study explains the factors that led NATO to undertake military action 
against former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the issues surrounding 
the legality of this war in context of intervention. This military operation is 
examined through the conduct of United Nations Security Council prior, 
during and after the military operation. The Security Council as the most 
dominant organ of the United Nations was set up to play the leading role in 
“world forum for managing threats to international order…[equipped] with 
primary responsibility for international peace and security (Article 24)”1. 
International order, peace and security on the other hand is managed by 
International Law that can be defined as a set of rules and principles of 
universal application that concern the behaviour of States as well as 
international organizations in their relations with each other, but also with 
private individuals and transnational corporations. 2   
Kosovo3, (the territory that triggered the intervention), is the disputed 
region between Kosovo’s Albanian majority and Serbia, and was an 
autonomous federal unit of Yugoslavia until 1989, when it was stripped of its 
autonomy by the former dictatorship regime of Slobodan Milosevic4 whose 
actions were the main contributors to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The 
1999 war in Kosovo, (and also the other Balkan conflicts of the 1990s), are 
generally believed to be a direct consequence of long rooted undemocratic 
procedures and injustices that overturned the balance both in democracy and 
nationalism, and gave impetus to greater nationalist pretensions. The war in 
                                                 
1 Bourantonis D., The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform (Routledge, Oxon, 2005), 
p.3 
2 Verma S. K. An Introduction to Public International Law (PHI Learning Pvt.,, New Delhi, 1998) 
pp.1-19 
3 Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. It has more than 100 recognitions from all 
parts of the world but it is not yet a UN member. See KosovoThanksYou, Who recognized 
Kosova, available from: http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ [Accessed July 30, 2103] 
4 O'Neill W., G., Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2002), p.21 
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Kosovo and the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians from their country5 
that followed triggered a vital legal debate centred on the legality of the 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
2.  UN Security Council activities related to Kosovo prior to NATO 
intervention 
 
The tense situation in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s aggravated the 
situation in Kosovo. The UN nations were alarmed but were often  severely 
restricted to present a united front of world despite being provided with 
evidence that  grave atrocities were occurring in Kosovo. The divided UN 
Security Council was a stumbling block to authorise use of force to prevent 
massive crimes in Kosovo. Indeed, this was the main reason why three 
permanent members of the Security Council (the USA, UK, and France) unable 
to get the backing of the two other Security Council members (Russia and 
China) decided to bypass the Council and go alone in order to save the world 
from similar awful scenes that the world saw during the Bosnian genocide,6 
occurring in Kosovo’s neighbourhood.   
The deterioration of the situation in Kosovo at various stages prompted 
discussions within the UN Security Council, but the Resolutions (even though 
draft agreements were difficult to be achieved due to large division within 
permanent members) were the only means to try and persuade Serbian (then 
Yugoslav government) to abide to Council’s decisions. There were a number of 
UN Resolutions adopted during the 1990s starting from 1993, when then 
Yugoslavia refused to allow special CSCE missions to be deployed in Kosovo.7 
As a result, the UNSC in its Resolution 855(1993) explained the importance of 
CSCE (now called OSCE) for the region when it noted that 
  
“…CSCE missions of long duration are an example of preventive 
diplomacy…[and called]  upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to reconsider their refusal to allow 
the continuation of the activities of the CSCE missions in Kosovo…”8 
                                                 
5 Human Rights Watch, Rape as a weapon of ethnic cleansing (New York, Human Rights Watch, 
March 2000)  
6 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ruled that Srebrenica was an act of 
genocide. See UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Facts about 
Srebrenica, available from: http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/ 
jit_srebrenica_ en. pdf [Accessed July 25, 2013] 
7 UN Security Council, RESOLUTION 855 (1993) in  
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/93sc855.htm [Accessed on July 30, 2013] 
8 ibid 
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However, when the UN commanders stationed in Bosnia asked NATO to 
intervene in order to protect the peacekeepers,9 then this marked a new 
development not only for NATO itself but for the region as well. The world and 
United Nations, at this point sensed that the war in ex-Yugoslavia is running 
out of control with widespread crimes against humanity culminating with the 
Srebrenica genocide in July 1995.10 Even though the Dayton Accord marked the 
end of Bosnian war through political and military means,11 still the images seen 
in Bosnia were vivid in the eyes and mind of world community.  
The Bosnia war had an important impact on the international view of 
Kosovo conflict. The rules of game changed, and the international decision 
makers sensed that diplomacy alone may not play a decisive role in stopping 
the Kosovo conflict, but realized that it is not going to be easy to apply the 
military means in the face of strong opposition at the Security Council. As the 
situation in Kosovo deteriorated during the early 1998, the Council debated the 
situation and on March 31, 1998 adopted the resolution 1160 (1998) imposing 
arms embargo against then Yugoslavia due to “the use of excessive force by 
Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in 
Kosovo…”12  
Instead of getting better, the situation deteriorated further to a degree that it 
became untenable which provoked fresh debates at UNSC and consequently 
within two months the Security Council approved three Resolutions against 
Yugoslavia. In the first Resolution 1199(1998) adopted in September 23, 1998 
the UNSC was 
 
“Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in 
particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian 
security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous 
civilian casualties …[and] by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, 
                                                 
9 Gordon M.R., CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: NATO; Modest Air Operation in Bosnia Crosses 
a Major Political Frontier available from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/11/world/conflict-balkans-nato-modest-air-operation-
bosnia-crosses-major-political.html [Accessed July 29, 2013] 
10 UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Facts about Srebrenica, 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach /view_from_hague/jit_srebrenica_en. pdf [Accessed 
July 25, 2013] 
11 Cousens,E.M.,and Cater C., K., Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001), p.27 
12 UN Security Council,  RESOLUTION 1160 (1998) available from:  
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm [Accessed on July 30, 2013] 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina and other European countries as a result of the 
use of force in Kosovo...”13 
 
The following Resolution 1203(1998) that ensued, tackled the verification of 
agreements reached and compliance with the Resolution 1199, “stressing the 
importance of proper coordination of humanitarian initiatives”14, The final 
Resolution prior to NATO intervention, the Resolution 1207(1998) called among 
others upon the authorities of both sides in the Kosovo conflict “to cooperate 
fully with the Prosecutor in the investigation of all possible violations”15. 
 
3. The NATO intervention: Evolution and Security Council 
 
During the Cold War the humanitarian intervention was not considered to 
be legitimate practice, but there has been a major and, to a large extent, a 
necessary shift since the early 1990s. After initial success in humanitarian 
military operations to rescue the Kurds in northern Iraq, in the aftermath of the 
1991 Gulf War, the lack of success in the case of Bosnia and even more in the 
Rwandan conflict, has given the international community a mood of pessimism 
and moral cynicism. However, in the case of Kosovo, where by mid- March 
1999 there was an alarming humanitarian catastrophe in which thousands were 
killed16 and hundreds of thousands were homeless, 17 the Kosovo crisis  was to 
be another ‘test’ for the global powers to act in order to avoid the awful 
repetitions of still fresh memories of Bosnia and Rwanda.  
In Kosovo case, finally, the same states that looked on while around a 
million Tutsi were slaughtered in a genocide, dropped bombs on Serbia so that 
no one could say they had done nothing, and even more, to stop further 
atrocities by the Serbian army. Still, without the sanction of the Security 
Council on March 24th, 1999, NATO’s aircrafts began to bomb Serbian targets 
practically in the whole of Yugoslavia.18 NATO’s decision to attack Yugoslavia 
marked a shift in the principles of the alliance. Before March 24th, 1999 NATO 
was to cater for the defensive purposes of the Western alliance against any 
                                                 
13 UN Security Council,  RESOLUTION 1199 (1998) available from:  
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm [Accessed on July 30, 2013] 
14  UN Security Council,  RESOLUTION 1203 (1998) available from:  
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1203.htm [Accessed on July 30, 2013] 
15 UN Security Council,  RESOLUTION 1207 (1998) available from:  
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1207.htm [Accessed on July 30, 2013] 
16 O'Neill W., G., Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2002), p.27 
17 Independent International Commission in Kosovo. Kosovo Report: Conflict , international 
response, lessons learned,  (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000),  pp.90-91 
18”Conflict in the balkans: the overview; nato opens broad barrage against serbs as clinton 
denounces yugoslav president”, New York Times,( 25 March 1999) p.6 
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possible outside military intervention. Alexandra Gheciu in her research argues 
that NATO’s post-Cold War focus was centred on spreading Western-based 
norms to a broad area of Europe.19 
The attack on Yugoslavia was in fact the first against a sovereign nation in 
NATO’s fifty years of existence. The Western powers put the blame for it 
squarely on the Serbian leader’s action against humanity. In fact, NATO’s 
Secretary General Javier Solana emphasized “clear responsibility for the air 
strikes lies with President Milosevic who refused to stop his violent action in 
Kosovo and has refused to negotiate in good faith”20. Furthermore, NATO 
statement affirmed that “the crisis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a 
challenge to the values that NATO has successfully defended for the past 50 
years: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”.21  
The NATO intervention alerted Russia, and the latter requested a Security 
Council meeting to discuss the latest developments and asking immediate halt 
to air attacks. The Russian Foreign Minister, at that time, Igor Ivanov was 
furious with NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and said ''Those who have 
unleashed the aggression against Yugoslavia must be prosecuted under 
criminal law''.22 However advocates of the NATO attack against Yugoslavia 
declared a diplomatic victory at the UN when the Russian resolution 
requesting the strikes to be ended, at the Security Council was rejected, by a 
large margin, 12 to 3, (only China and Namibia did vote in favour of Russia).23 
The Slovenien Representative at the time, Danilo Türk, made an interesting 
comment during this debate at Security Council, on  March 25th, 1999. He noted 
that halting military intervention is not justifiable at this point, as Security 
Council along with a number of its resolutions expressed grave concerns about 
peace and security in the region, and moreover he remarked  
 
                                                 
19 Gheciu, Alexandra, 2007, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization: NATO and the ‘New 
Europe,’” in Checkel, J. T. (Eds) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, (Cambridge 
University Press, New York,  2007) pp.171-207 
20 Clines F, ”Conflict in the balkans: the overview; nato opens broad barrage against serbs as 
clinton denounces yugoslav president”, New York Times,( 25 March 1999) p.6 
21 NATO Homepage, (April 23, 1999) Statement on Kosovo, on 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-062e.htm, [Accessed on May 4, 2013] 
22 Clines F. ., Myers S. L.,Conflict In The Balkans: The Overview; Nato launches daytime strike; 
Milosevic resisting fiercely; Two Serb jets are shot down available from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/27/world/conflict-balkans-overview-nato-launches-
daytime-strike-milosevic-resisting.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm [Accessed July 28, 2013] 
23 ibid 
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“According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council had the 
primary, but not exclusive responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security.24 
 
The war situation increased casualties and by around mid May 1999 the UN 
registered about 780,000 refugees,25 which prompted the Security Council to 
meet and approve the new Resolution 1239(1999) on Kosovo refugee assistance 
and express “grave concern at the humanitarian catastrophe in and around 
Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a result of the continuing crisis”.26 
During the seventy-eight days of the air campaign, Serbian and Yugoslav 
military, police, and paramilitaries drove out more than 850,000 ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo, internally displacing several hundred thousand more 
and terrorized the civilian population.27 
Finally, by June 1999 Yugoslav government capitulated and agreed to 
Western demands that subsequently led to the approval of the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244(1999). The latter resolution, among others called for  
 
“[v]erifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all [Yugoslav] military, 
police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable… 
[and][d]eployment…of effective international civil and security 
presences.”28  
 
The Resolution 1244 that also authorized establishing provisional political 
framework for self-governing democratic institutions of Kosovo, laid the 
foundations for free and democratic election. The circumstances created, led to 
the creation of self-governing institutions, culminating with independence 
                                                 
24 UN Security Council debate , Security Council rejects demand for cessation of use of force against 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  Press Release SC/6659 3989th Meeting (AM) 26 March 1999 
available from:  http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990326.sc6659.html 
[Accessed July 29, 2013] 
25 Krieger H., The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001)p.70 
26 UN Security Council,  RESOLUTION 1239 (1998) available from:  http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/143/75/PD F/N9914375.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed on 
July 30, 2013] 
27 Independent International Commission in Kosovo. Kosovo Report: Conflict , international 
response, lessons learned,  (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000),  p.90-91 
28 UN Security Council,  RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) available from:  http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/ 89/PDF/N9917289 .pdf? OpenElement [Accessed 
July 27, 2013] 
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declaration on February 17, 2008 that subsequently attracted widespread 
recognition worldwide.29 
 
4. NATO intervention and International Law 
 
While examining the Kosovo factor in light of the discussed legal system, 
inevitably, two questions surface; is it legal to attack a sovereign nation without 
Security Council resolution and more importantly, is it legal to allow an imminent 
catastrophe having Rwandan and Bosnian tragedy a case in point that could have 
been averted, had UN Security Council looked passionately at the calamity 
itself. One must bear in mind that the United Nations is created following the 
severe consequences of WWII devastations and it aimed to prevent similar 
catastrophes in the future. The United Nations values human lives; however, 
disunity within the Security Council members often distorts its human-caring 
mission. 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo had, undoubtedly, a great impact on 
international relations and respective international law. Humanitarian 
intervention doctrine is analysed by various scholars of international relations 
and their views often differ. Julia Holzgrefe in her study raises her voice in 
support of humanitarian interventions by elaborating the Rwandan genocide 
and non-intervention by the international community to prevent genocide from 
happening. She remarks that 
 
“In short three months, as many as 1 million Tutsis were shot, burned, 
starved, tortured, stabbed, or hacked to death. The international 
community did nothing to stop the Rwandan genocide…what measures 
should be taken to prevent similar catastrophes in the future?”30 
 
It is indeed, unspeakably appalling to comprehend how could the 
international community ignore atrocities at that scale by side-lining itself. The 
NATO intervention in Kosovo with no prior Security Council approval 
however, provoked among others also the debates about the ability of UN to 
have control in issues related to global peace and security. The United Nations 
Charter maintains that all non-defensive military actions need a Security 
Council approval (by supermajority),that includes the five permanent members 
                                                 
29 Kosovo Thanks You, Who recognized Kosova, available from: 
http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ [Accessed July 30, 2103] 
30 Holzgrefe J. L The humanitarian Intervention debates, p.17 in  : Holzgrefe J. L, and Keohane R.O 
Eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2003)  
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of the Council.31 On the other hand, UN Charter has serious concern about 
human rights and in its preamble maintains " We the peoples of the United 
Nations determined … to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war…”32 Confronting the Kosovo issue between two conflicting angles, Security 
Council principles versus International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, is 
rather inconvenient as one position must sacrifice the other.  
Analyzing and understanding the International Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law is crucial to focus on the objectives of this 
study. The International Human Rights Law with its origins from the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
 
”…lays down obligations which States are bound to respect. By becoming 
parties to international treaties, States assume obligations and duties 
under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfil human 
rights.”33  
 
The International Humanitarian Law, on the other hand, deals mainly with 
binding rules in armed conflict situations. Joan Policastri and Sergio Stone 
define the International Humanitarian Law as  
 
“…the binding rules and customs that govern armed conflict between 
nations, civil war combatants, and conflicts among states and non-state 
belligerents., the law of war, or law of armed conflict, the term 
international humanitarian law has gained currency since the early 
1960s…The primary sources are international conventions, customary 
law, judgments of international tribunals and domestic courts, and state 
practice...[and] constitute "Hague Law," regarding the conduct of 
hostilities, and "Geneva Law," which protects the victims of war.”34 
 
Since 1999, the Humanitarian Intervention, a new doctrine, derived from 
International Humanitarian Law is being applied, loosening the concept of 
sovereignty and taking the Responsibility to Protect the civilians.35 One, 
                                                 
31 U.N. Charter  Article. 27, Chapter. VII and VIII in United Nations, Charter of the United Nations,  
available from:  http://www.un.org/en/documents/ charter [Accessed July 25, 2013] 
32 Ibid Preamble 
33 United Nations Homepage, The foundation of international human rights law available from: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr /index.shtml [Accessed July 25, 2013] 
34 The American Society of International Law,  Policastri J., and Stone S., International 
Humanitarian Law available from: 
 http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=ihuml#id.pfy87dsrjx1l [Accessed July 25, 2013] 
35 ibid 
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therefore, senses that current international legal system is evolving. The 
existing human rights and humanitarian law proved, indeed, insufficient to 
prevent Rwandan, Bosnian, and other similar tragedies from occurring 
worldwide. All in all, with Srebrenica genocide, in particular, and other related 
Serbian crimes in Bosnia,36 fresh in mind to all, prompted the Western powers 
to view Kosovo conflict with urgent need to act and avert similar catastrophe. 
While the Humanitarian Intervention may be welcomed, the fairness of 
intervention is at stake and much more work has to be done for humanitarian 
intervention to gain the deserved reputability. 
Besides the humanitarian intervention, a similar doctrine but with a new 
name, the liberal interventionism, was introduced as new practical theory in 
1999, by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. During his Chicago speech, 
Mr Blair defined what later became known internationally as the doctrine of 
liberal interventionism.37 The Liberal interventionism is foreign policy doctrine 
that justifies liberal states’ military and humanitarian aid intervention in other 
sovereign states in order to reach liberal objectives.38 
Hedley Bull, a liberal realist explains that order among the countries and 
justice within them, were often mutually exclusive, where pursuing one tended 
to exclude the other. In his master piece, The Anarchical society: A study of order 
in World Politics, Bull emphasizes that humanitarian intervention should not be 
permitted in the face of disagreement about what constitutes extreme human 
rights violations in international society.39 However, theorists who express 
solidarity with forcible intervention in exceptional cases of human suffering do 
not stand in line with Bull’s arguments. The supporters of interventionist 
theory40 favour the idea to use force in the regions where the suffering of 
humans from violence has reached the highest peak, arguing that there is a 
legal right and moral duty to humanitarian intervention because the UN 
Charter commits states to protect fundamental human rights. In addition, there 
                                                 
36 The Independent,(February 8, 1993) Bosnia War Crimes: 'The rapes went on day and night': Robert 
Fisk, in Mostar, gathers detailed evidence of the systematic sexual assaults on Muslim women by 
Serbian 'White Eagle' gunmen available from: http://www.independent.co.uk 
/news/world/europe/bosnia-war-crimes-the-rapes-went-on-day-and-night-robert-fisk-in-
mostar-gathers-detailed-evidence-of-the-systematic-sexual-assaults-on-muslim-women-by-
serbian-white-eagle-gunmen-1471656.html [ Accessed July 25, 2013] 
37The Independent Newspaper(November 24, 2008), David Miliband: 'We must restore belief in 
the efficacy of liberal interventionism' available from: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/david-miliband-we-must-restore- 
belief-in-the-efficacy- of-liberal-interventionism-1032226.html [Accessed on May 10, 2013] 
38 ibid 
39Bull, H., The Anarchical society:A study of order in World Politics (Macmillan, London, 1977) 
40Interventionism refers to a practice of intervention in the affairs of another sovereign country. 
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is a right of humanitarian intervention in customary international law.41 
Therefore, theory of interventionism tends to be a tricky subject for discussion 
for the scholars of international relations, as many tend to agree to 
humanitarian justice over the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.  
The theory of interventionism is also backed by Christopher Greenwood, a 
law professor at the London School of Economics (LSE), who argued that 
intervention in Kosovo was lawful. Greenwood maintained that since the allied 
intervention in northern Iraq to save the Kurds in 1991 was accepted as 
legitimate, although undertaken without explicit authorization by the Security 
Council, the defeat of the Security Council’s condemnation of NATO’s air 
strikes against Serbia (remarked earlier) amounted to the approval of the 
military action.42 Elaborating further on the issue, Greenwood noted that as 
there was every indication that a catastrophe was occurring in Kosovo, which 
was a potential threat to global peace, and as there was a general consensus 
among the international community as to which side was responsible for this, 
made NATO bombing legal.43 
However, from the point of view of international relations, the expression 
of humanitarian sentiments by the West regarding the case of Kosovo was 
viewed to be a product of changing historical and social processes. For instance, 
the opponents of interventionism or liberal interventionism, the classical 
realists44 oppose the idea of  states  intervening for humanitarian  purposes, by 
arguing that countries do not really intervene for purely humanitarian, but for 
ulterior reasons and therefore states should never undertake such  steps.45 
Against the interventionist approach is also Andrew Fear, who, in his study in 
the book named Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion notes: 
 
“NATO’s marginalization of the UN is an act in defiance of, not in 
accordance with, the will of the international community, the 
majority of whom are opposed to its actions. It has set back 
immeasurably any chance that a distinct international forum will 
                                                 
41 Arend, A.C. and Beck, R. J.,  International Law and the use of  force, (Routledge, London, 1993),   
pp. 132-137 
42  “ When they don’t fit together”, The Economist, (Vol. 351, No.8113, 3 April 1999), p.18  
43  ibid 
44 Classical realism argues that the state is totally sovereign and is the primary unit of analysis in 
international relations This international relations theory is associated with the famous 
philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli. 
45 Baylis, J. and Smith, S. The Globalization of World Politics,  (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1998),  p.394 
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emerge, in particular one that could make binding decisions against 
the self-perceived interests of the USA.”46 
 
David Wippman, on the other hand, in his research titled “Kosovo and the 
Limits of International Law” disregards such a view and claims that intervention 
was lawful for a number of reasons. He argues that Serbia’s deeds in the region 
were a clear threat to peace and security, explicitly recognized in several 
Security Council adopted resolutions. In addition, Wippman remarks that 
NATO intervened only after Serbia’s repeated failure to abide Security Council 
adopted resolutions, as broad diplomatic efforts resulted in failure. 
Furthermore, Yugoslav action prior to intervention led to humanitarian 
catastrophe and this situation rendered to NATO triggered intervention that, 
after all, was not NATO’s self interest but anxiety regarding regional stability. 
Finally he maintains that NATO intervention enjoyed a great international 
support that was also reflected during the failure of Russia request to get 
approval for immediate halt of the bombing, alongside Security Council 
Resolutions that encouraged attainment of political settlement at the end of 
bombing campaign.47 
The Russians, who embraced the principle of non-interference in the affairs 
of a sovereign country, hence, supporting the classical realists’ theory, were 
deeply shocked by the Western air strikes on Yugoslavia.48 Russia being 
traditionally the ally of Serbia, immediately suspended their cooperation with 
the NATO alliance, besides calling an emergency meeting of the UN Security 
Council aiming to halt the military operation.49 Russia has always tried to keep 
its influence in the Balkans by holding on to every friendly state in this region.  
All in all, the practice of the military interventionism has changed the 
traditional meaning of sovereignty. The Westphalian sense of sovereignty, 
established in the mid- seventeenth century, signified the right of a country to 
control its internal affairs without external interference.50 Since the beginning of 
the 1990s, the principle of popular sovereignty has been added. In the new 
world order this means that sovereignty, which is derived from the people, can 
be executed on behalf and for the people and can be revoked if it is practiced 
                                                 
46 Fear, A., Looking neither forward nor back: NATO ‘s Balkan adventure, Kosovo, p.94 in  
Waller, M., Drezov, K., and Gökay, B., (eds) Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion (Frank Cass 
Publishers: London, 2001) 
47 Wippman D.  Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, Fordham International Law Journal, 
(Vol 25, Issue 1 Art 5, 2001), pp. 131-134 
48 “Moscow Recalls NATO Delegate in Protest”,  Washington Post ,  (25 March 1999), A31 
49 ibid 
50 Baylis,  J. and Smith, S.,  The Globalization of World Politics,  ( Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1998), pp. 19-21 
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against the people. This implies that if a particular ethnic group is too weak to 
stand up against violations of its right to self-determination, then the 
international community has the right to intervene.  
 
5. The impact of intervention in International Relations 
 
The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in context of international relations 
raised the question of interest, whether the West was acting out of some self-
interest or really carrying out a moral duty as it claimed. When focusing on 
primary interests, Kosovo, in realistic and rational terms is unlikely to be highly 
beneficial for the West. But probably the real concerns that stimulated the 
Western public, apart from humanitarian reasons, were fears of the 
destabilization of the region, which might have a ‘domino effect’ on 
neighbouring countries and possibly beyond. Western politicians, in fact, 
wanted to prevent the massive migration flows. They feared that the conflict 
would spill over from Kosovo to Macedonia (which it did in 2001), and then 
maybe even to Greece and Turkey.  
However, one can argue that, after NATO‘s victory, a precedent has been 
set for the alliance’s self-mandated intervention in other conflicts. The Kosovo 
war can be interpreted to have been a test case of the future role of NATO as 
the armed wing of the West, cloaked in the rhetoric of a new international 
moral consensus. In addition, what made NATO's air strikes successful is that 
the campaign fulfilled the goal of zero casualties among the Allies, which is 
quite normal for a parade, but not in a war.51 
As far as the question of winners and losers is concerned a final conclusion 
seems as yet premature.  However, in the terms of international relations, 
Russia seems to have lost face, somewhat. The Kosovo war had, in fact, a 
negative effect on Russian foreign policy. It caused some immediate damage to 
Russia's relationship with the West with its initial opposition. Russia was to a 
large extent disturbed, and her options for any support (besides emotional) of 
their fellow ally, Serbia, were largely limited. This was likely to make it slide 
into isolationism. With its weak economy and struggle to gain additional loans 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Russia could not afford 
deterioration of relations with the West. In the Kosovo crisis, what Russians 
expected from the West was more attention for itself. Furthermore, it did not 
want to be displaced or side lined, as The Economist observed, “All Russia wants 
from the West is…respect”.52 
                                                 
51Independent International Commission in Kosovo. Kosovo Report: Conflict , international response, 
lessons learned,  (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000)  p.181  
52 “It disagrees about Kosovo. Ah, Yes”, The Economist, (Vol. 350, No. 8112, 27 March 1999), p. 30  
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As the recent history has shown, internal violence tends to be no longer an 
internal affair of a sovereign state but of the international community as a 
whole. In the new normative practice, the basic human rights tend to be largely 
defined by the West as universal principles, transcending sovereignty, which is 
no longer inviolate. The examples of the recent past, like for instance, 
Milosevic's token sovereignty over Kosovo, Saddam Hussein's over Iraqi skies 
or Muammar Ghaddafi’s over Libyan skies clearly elaborate the point. 
As far as the issue of sovereignty is concerned, Segbers, Raiser and 
Warkalla note that the ‘Kosovo factor’, also infringed upon the sovereignty of 
Western countries, 
 
“by subjecting their alleged national interests to supranational purposes - 
NATO's search of action and leadership, preserving the Transatlantic 
relationship, shaping European Security and Defence Identity as well as 
Common Foreign and Security Policy - and to transnational 
technologies….[where] the leading actors were not states, (with a possible 
exception of the US), but institutions.”53  
 
Therefore, one can argue that the European governments were ready to 
accept the US pressure for military intervention because they mainly feared 
that the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo would lead the EU to 
accommodate the new flood of refugees.  
About twelve years later, after the 1999 Kosovo war, NATO intervened on 
humanitarian grounds again, but this time in the African continent, against 
Libya. NATO member states emphasized humanitarian concerns about the 
imminent threat by Libyan government forces.  NATO members argued that 
the world couldn’t stand idly when a tyrant like Ghaddafi terrorizes its own 
people. While the principle of humanitarian intervention signifies the 
beginning of a new world order, Kosovo will be placed  in history as the first 
war fought by NATO for the sake of human rights principles, not for the sake 
of self-defence. 
The future of humanitarian intervention is rather uncertain. A New York 
Times columnist Steven Erlanger while discussing the US secondary role in 
NATO’s intervention in Libya remarks that now we have “the “responsibility 
to protect” the new mantra, replacing Kosovo’s “humanitarian intervention.” 
Both are debatable, given the failure to intervene in the separatist Russian 
                                                 
53 Segbers K., Raiser S., & Warkalla B., (1999) After Kosovo: A Political Science Symposium – 
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republic of Chechnya then and Syria [now]…”54 Selective intervention may not 
be suitable for international reputation but still, is an improvement from where 
we were before. There is a famous proverb “better something than nothing”, 




This research paper addresses the interaction among three dimensions in 
the context of the new world order – Security Council actions, International 
Law, and International relations vis-à-vis NATO intervention in Kosovo. This 
study established that UN Security Council failed to present a united front in 
the wake of an international tragedy, while this disunity provided an 
opportunity for NATO to advocate its normative values and affirm the West’s 
supreme global role. While there are opposing views with regards to 
interventional approach, there is a general sense of acknowledgment that the 
human values take precedence over the Westphalian sense of sovereignty. 
An important lesson learned from the NATO intervention in Kosovo case is 
that sovereignty and human rights are not to be taken for granted. They are 
connected to the state and established in international law, but have no moral 
or historical basis. Selective military interventions in particular humanitarian 
crisis (while staying indifferent on others similar cases) may blur promising 
mission of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Syrian innocent civilians 
are every day facing cruelty and death at the hands of Assad dictatorship 
regime but neither Security Council nor the Western alliance are showing any 
particular interest in humanitarian intervention.  
The Security Council and the International Law as an institution, have 
power and authority but also moral responsibility for the entire global 
community. The actors behind such institutions need not balance self interests 
vis-à-vis international humanitarian tragedies, but act ethically and consciously 
in order to meet the goals of their founding fathers. Thus, still, there is a lot of 
work to be done, and that in good faith for the benefit of humanity. Acting 
ethically, responsibly and decisively is the key for future humanitarian 
interventions to gain further respect and endorsement, and not merely acting 
selectively or for particular economic or political gains.  
The NATO intervention in Kosovo, however, despite disunity at the 
Security Council, and the related debates regarding the legality of such 
intervention, should not be seen as a mere intervention, but as a pillar 
contributing to the development of the promising norm “Responsibility to 
Protect”, potentially conducive to whole international community.  
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Altogether, developing an international multifaceted strategy with regards 
to humanitarian intervention may not be easy, as various challenges exist. 
However, this should not prevent global powers and institutions to endeavor 
and explore ways towards achieving desired results. The outcomes of such 
strategy still may, sometimes cause short-term discomfort, but very likely will 
restore confidence worldwide and offer a bright prospect for the common 
future. Time will tell how much efforts and resources will be attributed in this 
ethical direction. 
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